On 9/3/20 11:08 PM, Sylvia Else wrote:

> People would start transmitting terabytes of genuinely random data to
> provide the NSA with something to do.

Um, funny that you mention it. I already do exactly this. I have set up
scripts to send fake data that looks like encrypted goodies. I've been
doing it for years.

It is easy to set up several tor hidden services and have them talk to
each other with randomly-timed, random gibberish while I do my browsing
from one of them through a double Tor tunnel.

Sending PGP-encrypted, fake messages to government email addresses
through anonymous remailers is another tactic. Put 'leaked' or
'classified' or 'top secret' or 'whistleblower report' in the subject or
in the clear with the message and you're good to go. Encrypt them to a
temporary public key then scrub the keys.

I presume (and I hope) that I have wasted a lot of the spooks' time over
the years.

Ain't I a stinker?

--

Pepe LePew

On 25/11/2021 16:55, Pepe LePew wrote:
> On 9/3/20 11:08 PM, Sylvia Else wrote:
>
>> People would start transmitting terabytes of genuinely random data to
>> provide the NSA with something to do.
>
> Um, funny that you mention it. I already do exactly this. I have set up
> scripts to send fake data that looks like encrypted goodies. I've been
> doing it for years.

If it's distinguishable from random, it doesn't look like encrypted
goodies. And if it isn't, it doesn't look like anything.

>
> It is easy to set up several tor hidden services and have them talk to
> each other with randomly-timed, random gibberish

Randomly re-opening an 18-month-old thread is easy too. That doesn't
mean it's bright.

<snip>

> I presume (and I hope) that I have wasted a lot of the spooks' time over
> the years.

They're not interested. If they want to know your secrets, they have
more cost-effective (and painful) techniques to find them out than
trying to decrypt your gibberish.

--
Richard Heathfield
Email: rjh at cpax dot org dot uk
"Usenet is a strange place" - dmr 29 July 1999
Sig line 4 vacant - apply within

On 11/25/21 11:41 AM, Richard Heathfield wrote:
> On 25/11/2021 16:55, Pepe LePew wrote:
>> On 9/3/20 11:08 PM, Sylvia Else wrote:
>>
>>> People would start transmitting terabytes of genuinely random data to
>>> provide the NSA with something to do.
>>
>> Um, funny that you mention it. I already do exactly this. I have set up
>> scripts to send fake data that looks like encrypted goodies. I've been
>> doing it for years.
>
> If it's distinguishable from random, it doesn't look like encrypted
> goodies. And if it isn't, it doesn't look like anything.
>
>>
>> It is easy to set up several tor hidden services and have them talk to
>> each other with randomly-timed, random gibberish
>
> Randomly re-opening an 18-month-old thread is easy too. That doesn't
> mean it's bright.

Does it then mean mean commenting about the obvious is bright? Do you
tend to nitpick as a means of trying to elevate yourself above other people?

Do you spend your time isolating and attacking the village idiot so you
can look clever? Do you fill this group up with critique of the usual
crank's drivel while you are not innovating any thing?

Do your comments here are add anything of value to the art of
cryptology? Or do your comments distract from fruitful labor in that regard?

Is the purpose of your posts here is to elevate yourself over others who
are already in the gutter? If one can't be king of Rome can he at least
be king of the royal outhouse?

> <snip>
>
>> I presume (and I hope) that I have wasted a lot of the spooks' time over
>> the years.
>
> They're not interested. If they want to know your secrets, they have
> more cost-effective (and painful) techniques to find them out than
> trying to decrypt your gibberish.

"They're not interested?" Since when did you become an apologist and
propagandist for the empire? Are you a moldy Angloid Canzcuck? serious
question. Are you?

Everyone in here with two brain cells to rub together knows that the
intelligence services don't just look for the needle in the haystack.
They take the whole haystack. If they're not interested in everyone's
communication then why are they taking the whole haystack?

If "they're not interested" in people's encrypted gibberish then what of
PRISM, XKeyScore, Echelon, Shadownet, Operation Glowing Symphony, and
billion-dollar IIA protocols? Do you believe everyone in this group is
that ignorant? Or are you that ignorant? Big reveal, people. Choose one.

--

Pepe LePew

On 25/11/2021 18:46, Pepe LePew wrote:

<snip>

>
> Do your comments here are add anything of value to the art of
> cryptology?

37 09 0B 53 1C 4F 01 57 1B 45 0C 16 16 53 00 17
04 01 4B 00

--
Richard Heathfield
Email: rjh at cpax dot org dot uk
"Usenet is a strange place" - dmr 29 July 1999
Sig line 4 vacant - apply within

Siri Cruise wrote:
> In article <20200903193058.00005eca@300baud.de>,
> Stefan Claas <sac@300baud.de> wrote:
>
> > Grim Reaper"(life) preciouse few are born with it, even fewer know what to do
> > with it, NO FEAR!!!!" wrote:
> >
> > > <https://threatpost.com/encryption-under-full-frontal-nuclear-assault-by-u-s
> > > -bills/157748/>
> >
> > To be honest I am so tired of these reports and discussions.
> >
> > Let them pass the bills and let's see what happens then.
>
> We already know. Consumer frauds and impersonations are routine
> because the federal government has been fighting civillian
> encryption since 1948.

Why did they changed then ITAR in the 90's , for example, which allows
U.S. companies and U.S. Open Source programmers to distribute strong
encryption globally, instead domestically only?

Regards
Stefan

On 04-Sep-20 3:30 am, Stefan Claas wrote:
> Grim Reaper"(life) preciouse few are born with it, even fewer know what to do with it, NO FEAR!!!!" wrote:
>
>> <https://threatpost.com/encryption-under-full-frontal-nuclear-assault-by-u-s-bills/157748/>
>
> To be honest I am so tired of these reports and discussions.
>
> Let them pass the bills and let's see what happens then.
>
> Regards
> Stefan
>
>

Those wanting to remain secure would use software that isn't subject to
US laws. Uncle Sam would be able to spy only on those who are either
stupid or don't care that much.

We'd then have to see what the Supreme Court thought of the proposition
that the use of strong encryption created probable cause for searches
and arrests.

People would start transmitting terabytes of genuinely random data to
provide the NSA with something to do.

Sylvia.

Op 03-09-2020 om 20:50 schreef Stefan Claas:
<SNIP>
>
> Why did they changed then ITAR in the 90's , for example, which allows
> U.S. companies and U.S. Open Source programmers to distribute strong
> encryption globally, instead domestically only?

Because the US companies would lose out on business, alternatives were
and are available.
>
> Regards
> Stefan
>
>
>

In article <hrdsumFagv4U1@mid.individual.net>,
Sylvia Else <sylvia@email.invalid> wrote:

> Those wanting to remain secure would use software that isn't subject to

Encryption hardware would be cheaper and faster. It would
encourage routine encryption as well as routine training in
student of cryptographic protocols.

--
:-<> Siri Seal of Disavowal #000-001. Disavowed. Denied. Deleted. @
'I desire mercy, not sacrifice.' /|\
The first law of discordiamism: The more energy This post / \
to make order is nore energy made into entropy. insults Islam. Mohammed

Dirk T. Verbeek wrote:
> Op 03-09-2020 om 20:50 schreef Stefan Claas:
> <SNIP>
> >
> > Why did they changed then ITAR in the 90's , for example, which allows
> > U.S. companies and U.S. Open Source programmers to distribute strong
> > encryption globally, instead domestically only?
>
> Because the US companies would lose out on business, alternatives were
> and are available.

Exactly! Add on top of that the motto 'supremacy&leadership' and everybody,
old enough, should ask themselves why Bill Clinton an AlGore 'invented' the
Internet. Before they 'invented' the Internet, the Internet was a friendly
place.

In this context people should also ask themselves why young people like
Mark Zuckerberg and others run so called 'social' media sites for free,
instead charging registered users a monthly usage fee, like global online
services did decades ago.

Does the NSA and friends don't do a good job in fighting terrorism and the FBI,
with rule 41, a good job in fighting child pornography? If not, then parents, for
example, should ask themselves why their minors need online 'social' media accounts
and a smartphone, instead of playing on the playground, doing something creative
and meeting with friends.

I guess China and Russia don't face these problems and will be quite happy
if these U.S. bills pass. Sleepy Europe may wake up and see it's chance
in securing then the commercial hard/software crypto market.

What I would be interested in, in case these bills pass, what would people
in the U.S. face in case they don't follow later laws and still use strong
encryption, under the hood of weak encryption, or via their protected U.S.
Postal Service. Or, will U.S. citizens face charges if they register their
accounts overseas, like in Switzerland etc. to use strong encryption with
these services.

Regards
Stefan

In article <20200904120315.0000021e@300baud.de>,
Stefan Claas <sac@300baud.de> wrote:

> Exactly! Add on top of that the motto 'supremacy&leadership' and everybody,
> old enough, should ask themselves why Bill Clinton an AlGore 'invented' the
> Internet. Before they 'invented' the Internet, the Internet was a friendly
> place.

And the parents of those everybodies knows Gore never claimed to
have invented the internet. What Gore did do is get congress to
subsidise the internet between the time it was a tool for
programmers using 1200 bps async or 9600 bps sync into the Mbps
commercial necessity used by much of the world's population.

Back when in the good old pre-Gore days the friendly internet
generally forbade commercial (ie for profit) use. Encryption
wasn't that important because money wasn't being transferred. In
the friendly days people included US mail addresses until the
unabomber started killing people with no discerned pattern or
motive.

Gore's subsidies created an environment that developped the
internet as a self sustaining business. However encryption was
still under World War 2 era laws. While sophisticated hardware
and software could be sold within the US, it could not be sold
outside the US. Computer sellers either had to maintain two lines
of product, foreign and domestic, or deny domestic customer
encryption.

Encryption software ran afoul of the first amendment since
software is an expression not a device. NSA still does whatever
it can. Encryption hardware is a device and can and is
restricted. Again suppliers either maintain separate domestic and
foreign lines or deny encryption to domestic customers.

Note the 'enemies' of the US like USSR, PRC, France, Russia don't
need to import from the US. They have been using unbreakable
ciphers for decades. The real enemies of the NSA are americans.
If two americans have a conversation for which the NSA cannot get
a transcript, the NSA has failed. As a result americans have to
depend on techniques barely advanced since the last world war to
protect their privacy, money, bank accounts, and commercial
transactions. That trust is repeatedly violated with routine
disclosures. Since the NSA doesn't have to pay legal penalties
they see no problems and no need to, like, protect the people.

Check out how banks do money transfers. Their asses are on the
line, so they do more than trust the NSA.

--
:-<> Siri Seal of Disavowal #000-001. Disavowed. Denied. Deleted. @
'I desire mercy, not sacrifice.' /|\
The first law of discordiamism: The more energy This post / \
to make order is nore energy made into entropy. insults Islam. Mohammed

Siri Cruise wrote:

> Note the 'enemies' of the US like USSR, PRC, France, Russia don't
> need to import from the US. They have been using unbreakable
> ciphers for decades. The real enemies of the NSA are americans.
> If two americans have a conversation for which the NSA cannot get
> a transcript, the NSA has failed. As a result americans have to
> depend on techniques barely advanced since the last world war to
> protect their privacy, money, bank accounts, and commercial
> transactions. That trust is repeatedly violated with routine
> disclosures. Since the NSA doesn't have to pay legal penalties
> they see no problems and no need to, like, protect the people.

I would see it this way, regarding NSA's real enemies: General
Alexander once said that they don't look for the needle in the
haystack, they take the whole haystack. Assuming the haystack
includes the whole U.S. Internet and telephone traffic, they do
this, I strongly assume, to filter later out the bad guys trying
to do harm to the United States and it's citizens.

If this would be not the case, what guaranties have U.S. citizens
that other parties, from overseas, are not capable of doing the
same to U.S. citizens?

Regards
Stefan

In article <20200904173938.000064ea@300baud.de>,
Stefan Claas <sac@300baud.de> wrote:

> Siri Cruise wrote:
>
> > Note the 'enemies' of the US like USSR, PRC, France, Russia don't
> > need to import from the US. They have been using unbreakable
> > ciphers for decades. The real enemies of the NSA are americans.
> > If two americans have a conversation for which the NSA cannot get
> > a transcript, the NSA has failed. As a result americans have to
> > depend on techniques barely advanced since the last world war to
> > protect their privacy, money, bank accounts, and commercial
> > transactions. That trust is repeatedly violated with routine
> > disclosures. Since the NSA doesn't have to pay legal penalties
> > they see no problems and no need to, like, protect the people.
>
> I would see it this way, regarding NSA's real enemies: General
> Alexander once said that they don't look for the needle in the
> haystack, they take the whole haystack. Assuming the haystack
> includes the whole U.S. Internet and telephone traffic, they do
> this, I strongly assume, to filter later out the bad guys trying
> to do harm to the United States and it's citizens.
>
> If this would be not the case, what guaranties have U.S. citizens
> that other parties, from overseas, are not capable of doing the
> same to U.S. citizens?
>
> Regards
> Stefan

GCHQ is the UK equivalent of NSA. NSA is not supposed to spy on
americans, and GCHQ is not supposed to spy on british. So NSA
spies on the british, GCHQ on americans, and they share with each
other.

That's when NSA doesn't just break the law and spy on americans
because they can get away with it.

The best way to protect americans is to tell NSA to piss off and
encourage strong encryption hardware for domestic and export
markets, encourage operating systems to provide simple
interfaces, and teach programmers how to use it routinely. It's a
question of whether the government should protect the people or
protect its ability to spy on the people.

--
:-<> Siri Seal of Disavowal #000-001. Disavowed. Denied. Deleted. @
'I desire mercy, not sacrifice.' /|\
The first law of discordiamism: The more energy This post / \
to make order is nore energy made into entropy. insults Islam. Mohammed

Siri Cruise wrote:
> The best way to protect americans is to tell NSA to piss off and
> encourage strong encryption hardware for domestic and export
> markets, encourage operating systems to provide simple
> interfaces, and teach programmers how to use it routinely. It's a
> question of whether the government should protect the people or
> protect its ability to spy on the people.

Isn't it interesting that engineers could in the 60's send men safely
to the moon, with little bit of computer technology and nowadays IT
giants are not able to design and manufacture (NIST, BSI) certified
secure IoT devices, whether desktop or mobile to protect users,
regardless if crypto is used or not?

Maybe visionaries like Elon Musk could give us such devices, in case
he would be interest in this huge market segment ...

Regards
Stefan

Stefan Claas <sac@300baud.de> wrote:
>
>Why did they changed then ITAR in the 90's , for example, which allows
>U.S. companies and U.S. Open Source programmers to distribute strong
>encryption globally, instead domestically only?

Why did they change it? Mostly because Americans spent a lot of time
protesting against it. People getting RCS tattoos, people selling
T-shirts with encryption algorithms on them, all making the US government
look like a laughingstock for trying to make mathematics into a secret.

The folks who were made to look like a laughingstock in the nineties are
still around and they are still fighting back. And they still have the
ludicrous idea that the good guys can have encryption without the bad guys
having it. Math isn't that way.

The idea is like a bad penny, it keeps comiong back.
--scott

--
"C'est un Nagra. C'est suisse, et tres, tres precis."

<https://threatpost.com/encryption-under-full-frontal-nuclear-assault-by-u-s-bills/157748/>

The U.S. government and tech companies continue to butt heads over the idea of encryption and what that means for law enforcement.

Encryption expert Riana Pfefferkorn believes new proposed laws – the EARN IT Act and the Lawful Access to Encrypted Data Act – pose dire threats to cybersecurity and privacy.

In this Threatpost interview, Pfefferkorn, who is associate director of Surveillance and Cybersecurity at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society, lends valuable insight as to why proposed legislation is a “full-frontal nuclear assault on encryption in the United States.”

“I think we’re at a point where there is a rising tide around the world of threats to encryption and threats to our online freedoms more generally,” Pfefferkorn told Threatpost. “And it’s going to become more and more difficult, both as a regulatory atmosphere and as normative matter for companies to continue holding the hardline and saying, we cannot afford to go backwards on cybersecurity in light of the kinds of data breaches, information attacks and ransomware we face right now in the world.”

Listen to the full interview with Pfefferkorn below.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lFS959M-8NU>

Below is a lightly edited transcript of the interview.

Lindsey O’Donnell-Welch: Hi, everyone, this is Lindsey O’Donnell Welch with Threatpost and I am joined today by Riana Pfefferkorn, the Associate Director of Surveillance and Cybersecurity at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society. Riana, thank you so much for joining us today.

Riana Pfefferkorn: Thank you for having me.

LO: So just for all of our viewers, Riana’s work focuses on investigating and analyzing the U.S. government’s policy and practices for forcing decryption and influencing crypto-related design of online platforms and services, both via technical means and through the courts and legislators. And so that is very applicable for what we’re talking about today, which is a recently introduced bill called the Lawful Access to Encrypted Data Act. And that was introduced in June and Riana I want to talk to you a little bit about this, but this bill argued that the ending of the use of “warrant proof encrypted technology” would “bolster national security interests, and better protect communities across the country.” Now, this has generated a lot of backlash from the security and from the privacy space. And I know that you had many thoughts about this as well. So can you talk to me a little bit about what specifically this bill is and kind of what the fine print is for it, and really what it consists of?

RP: Sure. So what this bill does is that it would amend the various parts of the existing framework that we have for the issuance of warrants under federal statute and the issuance of other types of surveillance orders. In the past it has not been clear within the scope of those laws, whether the government could force a company to decrypt information or provide other technical assistance in order to provide access to the plain text of encrypted data. We’ve seen a couple of court decisions saying no, the existing laws do not go so far as to do what it is that you are asking to do, for example, in the Apple versus FBI San Bernardino case involving a warrant to get into a locked phone. So the goal of this bill, as I see it, is to clarify by making additions and amendments to those laws to that statutory framework, so that rather than relying upon the arguments that the Department of Justice and the FBI have made in recent years to say “these existing laws allow us to get what we want in terms of decrypting data.” Now, this is an admission, “okay, those laws don’t do that.” And therefore, there needs to be amendments to make that more clear. So this would specifically say that for providers of online services -so that could be pretty much anybody. It could be websites, it could be email, it could be social media. It could be apps and so forth – they would have to decrypt data upon demand. If you are a smaller provider with under a million users or customers or devices sold annually in the U.S., you will be subject to receiving a capability notice from the Attorney General saying build a decryption capability for us to get into your service or your device. If you have more than a million monthly active users or devices sold in the United States, annually, etc, then you would have to proactively redesign your products, your service in order to have a decryption capability, so that if and when you do receive a warrant or a wiretap order, etc., then you will already have the ability to decrypt that information for law enforcement. So this is a significant escalation from what we have seen in the encryption debate in recent years, where as I said, it’s mostly been relying upon interpretations of existing language and laws on the books and sort of novel stretching the envelope with regard to what those laws might say. And we have not yet seen any as overt bills as this that directly go to saying encryption out loud.

LO: Right. And I think you make a really good point there about the fact that we’ve seen several kind of bills and policies being discussed that are targeting encryption, but maybe not being so outward about it. Clearly, you’ve been looking at this for a long time and how the U.S. government is handling this. Can you talk a little bit just for context here, about how you’ve seen this debate between law enforcement and the tech industry and and encryption evolve over time? I mean, obviously, we’ve seen the big ones like in 2016, Apple versus FBI over the San Bernardino shooter and then it came to a head again, earlier this year too, right? I mean, the whole FBI asking Apple to help unlock the iPhone of the Pensacola shooter. So really what have you seen? And how have you seen this kind of pretext evolve over time?

RP: Yeah, I think that what we’ve seen has been a shift from, prior to about 2014, it was largely pretty straightforward for law enforcement to be able to go and get access to the encrypted data, because at the time, we didn’t yet have as much web traffic encrypted as there is now, we didn’t have strong end to end encryption built in by default into a lot of popular messaging services the way we do now. And iPhones and Android phones did not have device or file based encryption built in by default, the way that we do now. And so it was just easier for investigators with the kinds of legal process that I mentioned – wiretap orders, warrants, etc. – To be able to get decrypted data because that capability was still there. Since about six years ago, both device manufacturers and app makers have re-engineered their products to make that harder, out of a recognition that there’s a lot of risk to people’s personal data, sensitive information, financial information that can be from having that ability to access it. So by cutting law enforcement out of the loop, this is something that they take as a personal affront to themselves. But really, it’s more designed to keep out your cyber criminals, your hackers, your identity thieves, foreign state actors, as well as you know, company’s own employees. We’ve seen just recently with the Twitter hack, where that was allegedly, at least in part, a social engineering hack that took place in order to do a stupid cryptocurrency scam. And if that’s the case, we really dodged a bullet there because when employees have powerful access to people’s information, including in the Twitter hack, apparently at least one person’s direct message inbox was accessed, direct messages aren’t end to end encrypted, the more that companies realize that they need to build themselves into their threat models for their users, the more we’ve seen them embrace end to end encryption as a means of protecting users information. And so that I don’t think that it is accurate for law enforcement to say this is just about us. This is you targeting us. I think it’s more about companies saying, look, law enforcement does not have a monopoly on ensuring people’s safety, we have a responsibility to our users, to their privacy, to their security, to the real world safety impact of not securing their data adequately. And so we need to be taking this responsibility on for ourselves. So it’s really a matter of taking on more responsibility for users, rather than abandoning it and abandoning that responsibility, the way that law enforcement tries to depict it.

LO: And I know you also mentioned that we’re seeing a ton of kind of policy from the U.S. government around this as well. And one of these more recent related bills that we’re seeing is the EARN IT act. Can you talk about kind of that proposed bill and kind of what, how that’s different, I guess from the Lawful Access to Encrypted Data Act of 2020, how they’re the same and kind of how that fits into all of this as well.

RP: Sure. So there were rumblings about the EARN IT act bill as far back as around the beginning of the year back in January. The bill text came out in March, and there was an immediate public outcry because it was very clear that it was kind of a sneak attack on encryption. What that bill would do, and what still would do under the current amended version of it that has has been put forth more recently, is that it would curtail platforms – again, email, social media apps, etc. – Their immunity that they enjoy under federal law, a law called Section 230 against liability against state criminal charges and private plaintiff civil lawsuits for child sex abuse material on their services. Now, there’s already a federal law that governs what platforms are supposed to do when they learn about this kind of material on their services, and whom they have to report it to, and how long they have to keep it for etc. But rather than amending that law, this bill goes after Section 230, I think because there’s kind of a general public distaste now for big tech, people are kind of fed up. And section 230, while it’s sort of poorly understood is something that I think lawmakers or law enforcement officials who may be behind drafting both of the two bills we’re talking about today, may have seized upon as an expeditious way to kind of get public sentiment behind them, in addition to the fact that we’re talking about one of the most heinous possible crimes out there, which honestly, it’s surprising that this hadn’t been brought out before. It’s kind of a nuclear weapon to bring out child sex abuse material. When previously it’s been kind of lumped in with more of the terrorism focus that we had seen previously around the Pensacola base shooting and around the San Bernardino shooting.

Grim Reaper"(life) preciouse few are born with it, even fewer know what to do with it, NO FEAR!!!!" wrote:
> <https://threatpost.com/encryption-under-full-frontal-nuclear-assault-by-u-s-bills/157748/>

To be honest I am so tired of these reports and discussions.

Let them pass the bills and let's see what happens then.

Regards
Stefan

In article <20200903193058.00005eca@300baud.de>,
Stefan Claas <sac@300baud.de> wrote:

> Grim Reaper"(life) preciouse few are born with it, even fewer know what to do
> with it, NO FEAR!!!!" wrote:
>
> > <https://threatpost.com/encryption-under-full-frontal-nuclear-assault-by-u-s
> > -bills/157748/>
>
> To be honest I am so tired of these reports and discussions.
>
> Let them pass the bills and let's see what happens then.

We already know. Consumer frauds and impersonations are routine
because the federal government has been fighting civillian
encryption since 1948.

Imagine if encryption hardware was routine and fast enough that
all your storage was strongly encrypted and your device had slots
for keys to unlock various parts of your storage. Anyone stealing
your device without a key would have nothing more than a metalic
brick.

--
:-<> Siri Seal of Disavowal #000-001. Disavowed. Denied. Deleted. @
'I desire mercy, not sacrifice.' /|\
The first law of discordiamism: The more energy This post / \
to make order is nore energy made into entropy. insults Islam. Mohammed

On 2020-09-05, Stefan Claas <sac@300baud.de> wrote:
> Maybe visionaries like Elon Musk could give us such devices, in case
> he would be interest in this huge market segment ...

Elon Musk is more of a carnival huckster and confidence trickster
than he is a "visionary". I certainly have no interest in going
where his "vision" would take me.

--
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
18 Reasons I won't be vaccinated -- https://tinyurl.com/ebty2dx3
Covid vaccines: experimental biology -- https://tinyurl.com/57mncfm5
The fraud of "Climate Change" -- https://RealClimateScience.com
There is no "climate crisis" -- https://climatedepot.com
Don't talk to cops! -- https://DontTalkToCops.com
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

On 9/4/2020 4:31 AM, Siri Cruise wrote:
> In article <20200904120315.0000021e@300baud.de>,
> Stefan Claas <sac@300baud.de> wrote:
>
>> Exactly! Add on top of that the motto 'supremacy&leadership' and everybody,
>> old enough, should ask themselves why Bill Clinton an AlGore 'invented' the
>> Internet. Before they 'invented' the Internet, the Internet was a friendly
>> place.
>
> And the parents of those everybodies knows Gore never claimed to
> have invented the internet. What Gore did do is get congress to
> subsidise the internet between the time it was a tool for
> programmers using 1200 bps async or 9600 bps sync into the Mbps
> commercial necessity used by much of the world's population.
>
> Back when in the good old pre-Gore days the friendly internet
> generally forbade commercial (ie for profit) use. Encryption
> wasn't that important because money wasn't being transferred. In
> the friendly days people included US mail addresses until the
> unabomber started killing people with no discerned pattern or
> motive.
[...]

What about using encryption to protect trade secrets... If I need to
communicate with a colleague across the internet, and the content of the
communication involved sensitive company secrets... Why not encrypt the
shit out of it?

In article <20200904173938.000064ea@300baud.de>,
Stefan Claas <sac@300baud.de> wrote:

> If this would be not the case, what guaranties have U.S. citizens
> that other parties, from overseas, are not capable of doing the
> same to U.S. citizens?

NSA spies on the UK and shares with UK. GHQ spies on the US and
shares with the US.

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Siri Cruise <chine.bleu@yahoo.com> wrote:

> In article <20200904173938.000064ea@300baud.de>,
> Stefan Claas <sac@300baud.de> wrote:
>
> > If this would be not the case, what guaranties have U.S. citizens
> > that other parties, from overseas, are not capable of doing the
> > same to U.S. citizens?
>
> NSA spies on the UK and shares with UK. GHQ spies on the US and
> shares with the US.
>

s/GHQ/GCHQ

Hi, BTW.

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