Russia has vulnerabilities that the West has simply not been exploiting.
On the contrary, US incrementalism has helped the Kremlin offset and mask
its weaknesses. The Kremlin�s weaknesses include its inability to rapidly
pivot, dependence on others for Russia�s capability to sustain the war,
and years of risk accumulation that Russian President Vladimir Putin is
yet to reckon with. The Kremlin is vulnerable to an adversary who can
generate momentum against Russia and deny the Kremlin opportunities to
regroup and adapt. A serious US strategy on Ukraine would prioritize
achieving such momentum. It would include removing Western-granted safe
havens for Russia�s war machine. It would also include not only imposing
multiple dilemmas on the Kremlin but the most painful ones, such as
helping Ukraine make Russia fail on the battlefield faster and
dismantling Russian narratives in the West. While it is premature to draw
conclusions about Ukraine�s offensive in Kursk Oblast, the operation
clearly has the potential to generate momentum. If it does, the United
States should help Ukraine build on rather than dampen this momentum to
regain control over the tempo of the war.

Russia�s Vulnerability to Sustained Pressure

Russia adapts if given time. Russia does not pivot rapidly, however, in
part because of Putin�s risk aversion. It took Putin months to adapt
after his failed three-day invasion in 2022. He continued to pursue his
maximalist objectives in Ukraine with insufficient force and ordered a
mobilization only after a rout of the Russian forces from the Kharkiv
region in September 2022.[1] It took Putin a year to start moving the
Russian economy to a full war footing.[2] Likewise, the Kremlin has been
slow to react to Ukraine�s Kursk offensive. The Kremlin waited days after
the start of Ukraine�s incursion to announce a counterterrorism operation
in Russia�s border regions.[3] Putin has yet to implement martial law
despite repeated calls from the Russian nationalist community to do so.
[4]

Putin has proven to be decisive but not extemporaneous. His boldest moves
followed deliberate preparation, which the West often ignored or missed.
A decade of Russian information operations in Ukraine preceded the
Kremlin�s hybrid operation in eastern Ukraine in 2014.[5] Russia launched
the full-scale invasion of Ukraine only after Putin re-solidified his
grip on power with constitutional amendments in 2020 and normalized
Russia�s military presence in Belarus in 2021, which the Kremlin had been
trying to secure for years.[6] Putin has demonstrated a calculated and
often risk-averse approach in his key military decisions. Putin declared
a smaller, less politically costly partial mobilization in September 2022
instead of embracing the need for general mobilization. This decision
ultimately led to Putin undercutting Russia�s mobilization potential.[7]

Putin faced real risks in moments when he was challenged by sustained
pressure. The Ukrainian battlefield successes in the fall of 2022 led to
hysteria in the Russian information space, as the military humiliation
contrasted with Putin�s attempt to project an image of a �great
Russia.�[8] The consecutive shocks of Russian withdrawal from the Kharkiv
region and Kherson City drove fissures within Putin�s nationalist base
and laid the foundation for the spat between the late PMC Wagner Group
financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Russian military establishment, which
eventually resulted in Prigozhin�s rebellion in 2023.[9] The shock of
these defeats also led Putin to undertake notable rhetorical changes,
framing Russia�s war in Ukraine as a protracted war against NATO and the
West, rather than Ukraine.[10]

Had the West rushed military aid to Ukraine and planned for successive
operations after the Russian defeat in the Battle of Kyiv in spring 2022
or even after Russia�s offensive culminated in Severodonetsk in summer
2022, Ukraine would be closer to a durable peace than it is today.[11]

On the contrary, Western incrementalism in the provision of military aid
disrupted Ukraine�s battlefield momentum and provided Russia with a
three-fold advantage: a chance for Russian forces to build their defense
in depth, which monumentally complicated Ukrainian 2023 counteroffensive;
a chance for the Kremlin to seize the narrative internationally; and a
reduction in domestic pressures on Putin.

The United States� incrementalism and choice to telegraph its decisions
diminished the effectiveness of US policies. Delays in US decision-making
afforded Russia time to develop countermeasures to US capabilities.
Russia is using EW and GPS jamming to degrade the effectiveness of US
ground-based long-range fires.[12] The United States� telegraphing its
internal debates about its restrictions on Ukraine�s use of US weapons
gives the Kremlin time to insulate Russia from damage. Russia redeployed
air assets in the range of ATACMS to airbases further away from Ukraine
to protect them against a potential US policy change for Ukraine. The
shock of Ukraine using new capabilities will likely have greater effects
if the West stops announcing or leaking its decisions to deliver advanced
capabilities to Ukraine, as the Russian military remains slow to change
its posture to new threats.

Limits of Russia�s Inherent Capability

Russia depends on the will of others more than many people realize. A lot
of Russia�s capability to sustain the war in Ukraine is not inherent and
is, therefore, vulnerable. The Kremlin acquired some of its capabilities
by force, manipulation, or by exploiting Western resources and
sanctuaries. Russia depends on basing in Belarus to attack Ukraine from
the north. Russia depends on foreign trade routes and intermediaries to
smuggle sanctioned goods.[13] Russia depends on foreign machinery and
components to produce advanced weapons.[14] Russia depends on North Korea
and Iran to offset shortages in materiel.[15] Russia depends on �shadow
fleets� to transport its energy.[16] Russia depends on Western media to
cycle its false narratives. Russia depends on continued US will to grant
Russia a safe space, from which Russia can strike Ukraine with impunity �
without being struck back by Ukraine with long-range US-provided systems.
[17] The Kremlin depends on continued Western choice not to expel the
Kremlin�s agents of influence and revenue, like Russia�s state nuclear
operator Rosatom.[18]

Above all, the Kremlin depends on the West�s accepting Russia�s
fabricated assertions about reality, which often cause the West to reason
to conclusions that advance Russia�s interests and not ours.[19] Key
examples include the false assertion that Russia has the right to a self-
defined sphere of influence, and, therefore, a right to do whatever it
wants to those within this sphere � including invading � with no
repercussions. Another example is a false assertion that any provision of
advanced military capability to Ukraine is a red line that will result in
a nuclear escalation, and therefore, the US should de facto grant a veto
to any nuclear power over US national security policy. Kremlin�s strategy
in Ukraine disproportionately depends on the West accepting these
premises, making Russia vulnerable to changes in Western perceptions.
Russian dependencies give the West opportunities to exploit or dismantle
Russia�s capability to sustain the war against Ukraine.

Russia cannot siphon capability from others overnight. It takes time to
secure capabilities by manipulation or force and to convert partnerships
into capabilities. It took Putin at least six years to force Belarus into
becoming a de facto Russian military base.[20] It took months for Russia
to establish joint UAV production with Iran in Tatarstan.[21] Russia is
vulnerable to an adversary capable of anticipating and disrupting the
Kremlin�s pivots before the Kremlin can turn them into war capability.

Russia�s partnerships require tradeoffs and are vulnerable when both
partners are pressured. While the Russo�Iranian partnership is durable,
its military interdependence enhances mutual capability only as long as
Russia and Iran are not challenged at the same time. Russia�s loss of
advanced air defense systems and air assets in Ukraine will likely limit
the Kremlin�s ability to spare those systems for Iran � at a time when
Iran may increasingly require them especially if the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) were to face a full-fledged Israeli-
partner response to its aggression. The Kremlin�s reported message that
Iran should exercise restraint when acting against Israel is therefore
unsurprising.[22] The Russo�Iranian partnership is therefore vulnerable
to a cohesive US strategy to counter both threats if the United States
were to adopt one. Moreover, Russia�s growing intent to arm Iranian
proxies, aimed at deterring Western support to Ukraine, can backfire by
inviting US retaliation, were Iranian proxies to threaten US assets
directly with Russian capabilities, and by further undermining the
Kremlin�s ability to balance between regional stakeholders.[23]

Many of Russia�s relationships do not have a durable foundation and may
crumble if �partners� perceive Russia�s loss. Demonstrating that Russian
victory is not inevitable will have compounding effects on Russian
ability to sustain the war. China is Russia�s enabler in this war, but it
has not openly provided military assistance to Russia.[24] China is
behaving in a metered way likely not to heavily support a proposition
that may be losing. The Kremlin is alienating even its close partners.
Kremlin propagandists and officials have been threatening Armenia and
Kazakhstan if either were to pivot away from Russia.[25] Armenia is
distancing itself from the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO), as Russia has proven to be an unreliable partner
when it failed to protect Armenia against the 2023 Azerbaijani attack.
[26] Russian partnerships that are purely transactional are also at risk.
Russia�s ability to provide value, such as reliable military exports,
will further diminish if the West exhausts Russian capability faster.[27]
Helping Russia lose faster in Ukraine will likely accelerate the process
of other states distancing themselves from the Kremlin.