Trump is a pro-terrorist Communist which is why he surrendered to the
Taliban. Most terrorists are conservative, mostly religious lunatics but
trump is a cocksucker and his J6 terrorist followers are filling our
prisons.

Trump�s deal with the Taliban set the stage for the Afghan collapse
by David Schanzer, opinion contributor - 08/17/21 11:30 AM ET

History will mark Aug. 15, 2021, as the date that the Afghan government
collapsed and the Taliban retook control over this troubled and war-torn
country. But the real date that the Taliban�s victory was assured is Feb.
29, 2020, the day the Trump administration signed what it characterized as
a �peace� deal with the Taliban. Once this agreement was signed � the
tragic collapse we witnessed this weekend was inevitable.

Of course, the agreement was not, and could not possibly have been, a
�peace� deal since one of the parties currently at war � the Afghan
government � was not a signatory. Rather, this was a �withdrawal� agreement
between the U.S. and the Taliban that set the terms for the complete
departure of American troops from Afghanistan by May 2021.

What did the United States gain in exchange for this withdrawal, for which
the Taliban had been fighting for 20 years? Nothing but vague,
unenforceable promises that the Taliban would not engage in hostilities
against the departing U.S. troops and would �send a clear message� to al
Qaeda that it �had no place� in Afghanistan. So eager Trump was to
withdraw, we did not even hold out for a clear, firm commitment that the
Taliban would not provide aid, safe harbor or weaponry to al Qaeda and
like-minded groups. The agreement contained no enforcement mechanisms and
included no penalties on the Taliban for failing to comply with its terms.

Once the agreement was signed, the fate of the Afghan government was
signed, sealed and delivered � the Taliban had practically won the war.
There was no way that the government could possibly survive.

The fact that the United States entered into negotiations and then an
agreement with the Taliban, without even inviting the Afghan government to
the table, undercut the power and legitimacy of the government. The
citizenry, including those in the national armed services and police, could
plainly see that its own government was being ignored, a helpless bystander
in critical discussions about the country�s future. After we had cut the
legs out from under this government and rendered it a paper tiger, it is no
wonder that when those serving in the Afghan army and police were asked to
fight, most said, �No, thanks.�

The agreement also did absolutely nothing to attempt to bring about a
peaceful settlement of the war between the Afghan government and the
Taliban. A genuine peace deal would have made our withdrawal contingent on
the progress of peace negotiations between the Afghan government and the
Taliban. But it did not. Trump agreed unconditionally to bring down U.S.
troop levels to 8,600 by mid-July 2020 and totally withdraw by May 2021.

The agreement anticipated there would be peace negotiations, but in August,
Trump voluntarily cut troop levels down to 4,500, even more quickly than
required by the agreement, even though negotiations had not even begun.
This was a clear signal there would be no linkage between withdrawals and
peace, contrary to what U.S. diplomats were telling the parties. This
signal was received loud and clear by the Taliban. They balked at starting
negotiations until December, and even then, had zero incentive to make any
concessions since Trump had already announced that there would be only
2,500 troops in Afghanistan by the time he left office, the smallest U.S.
force in 20 years. It was clear to the Taliban that the Americans were
quickly headed for the exits.

When the fighting season began again this year, the only hope for the
Afghan government was to show that it could stand up to the Taliban even
with reduced American support to gain leverage at the bargaining table. But
results on the ground were just the opposite. The Taliban gobbled up
territory more quickly than it had in years. As the Taliban�s power
increased, it had even less reason to engage in peace negotiations.

To stem the Taliban�s momentum on the ground this spring, the Biden
administration would have had to not only abrogate the Trump withdrawal
agreement but also deploy more troops and get them more deeply involved in
the fighting. This would have breached Biden�s campaign commitment to end
the war in Afghanistan and ran against the strong bipartisan public support
for withdrawal.

The Taliban reads statements from American politicians and likely watches
poll numbers. They could not have been surprised when, in April, Biden
reaffirmed the American commitment to a complete withdrawal of troops,
albeit on a somewhat slower timetable.

The Taliban knew it had won the war once Biden�s predecessor had signed the
troop withdrawal agreement � now it was only a matter of time.

David Schanzer is a professor of public policy at the Sanford School of
Public Policy at Duke University and the director of the Triangle Center on
Terrorism and Homeland Security.